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CHAPTER 1
INTOODUCTION
In a social situation, anxious people may experience a range of
unpleasant symptoms. They might feel their hearts beat faster and hear their
voices shake. They may be distracted by self-focused thoughts about how the
interaction is going or how well they are doing. Thoughts may intrude that
remind them how poorly they are performing and how badly the interaction
will turn out. Prospects of failure may tempt them to bolt from the situation, or
withdraw in other ways. What would happen if we asked anxious people to
form an impression of an interaction partner?
The processes and effects of anxiety have been variously documented,
and the evidence suggests that anxious people do not do well in complex
situations, which might then hold for person perception. For example, anxiety
is likely to cause arousal, which can limit the range of cues the anxious person
notices (Easterbrook, 1959). Self-focused thoughts may distract the anxious
person from another task, hurting performance (Bates, Campbell, & Burgess,
1990; Sarason, 1980; Sarason & Sarason, 1990; Wine, 1980). Expectations of
failure at a task may cause an anxious person to withdraw physically or
mentally from the task, again hurting performance (Carver & Scheier, 1988).
Anxious people are bothered by worries that sigiuficantly interrupt their
attention to other tasks (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983; Clark
& de Silva, 1985; Deffenbacher, 1980). These anxiety-related ruminations, like
most unwanted thoughts, are extremely difficult to suppress, so anxious people
1
2may feel unable to control the interrupting thoughts (Clark & de Silva, 1985;
Wegner, 1989; Wegner, Shortt, Blake, & Page, 1990). Although they may
expend more effort to make up for their distraction, this increased effort may
still not be enough to succeed at complex cognitive tasks (Eysenck & Calvo,
1992). Any of these effects of anxiety might similarly interfere with complex
person perception.
Fiske and Emery (1993) describe a theory of how anxiety and mental
control deprivation might lead to attempts at social control. The capacity and
control theory of anxiety contains predictions about how anxiety might cause
people to simplify (i.e., categorize or fail to differentiate) other people. They
illustrate their theory with a psychoanalytic case study of a man remanded into
therapy by the legal system. His "thinking was scattered and impulse driven"
and his "stance toward other people was aggressively controlling....His
conscience took an 'immoral' stance toward others as things to be manipulated
for his own good and supposedly theirs" (p. 183). The client's scattered
thinking left him feeling out of mental control, and he turned to controlling
others as a substitute. He viewed others in stereotyped, categorical terms.
Fiske and Emer/s theory deals with how people like the man in the case study
react to being out of mental control. They cite anxiety as an important example
of the phenomenon. They propose that anxious people's uncontrollable,
intrusive thoughts have two effects: they take up cognitive capacity, and they
cause anxious people to feel out of mental control. While the control decrement
motivates anxious people to want to regain control, the capacity decrement
takes away resources with which to do so. As a result, anxious people may
3resort to controlling others. Stereotyped thinking and categorization are easier
to do with the anxious person's depleted cognitive resources. Categories also
make others seem simpler and, to the anxious person, may make them seem
easier to control. In this paper I develop and explain the details of the evolving
theory below; Table 1 presents the steps of the current theory and each step's
specific hypotheses in tabular form.
Capacity Decrements
People's capacity to process information is said to be fixed-it cannot be
increased (Kahneman, 1973). Different attentional tasks require different
amounts of capacity, and when a task exceeds a person's capacity, the task fails.
When two tasks compete for limited capacity, one or both might fail. To some
extent, people can control how they use their capacity by choosing to expend
more effort on a task they deem important.
The intrusive ruminations that anxious people experience take up
cognitive capacity. Both the test anxiety literature (Deffenbacher, 1980; Sarason
& Sarason, 1990) and research on general anxiety (Bates, Campbell, & Burgess,
1990; Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983; Clark & de Silva, 1985)
confirm that anxiety has a "worry" component consisting of intrusive thoughts,
mostly focusing on the future, the self, or performance. The worry component
is specified in anxiety research as a significant distractor from other tasks (Clark
& de Silva, 1985; Wine, 1980).
In general, when people are distracted, they form simpler impressions of
others. For example, "busy" subjects fail to include situational constraints on
that person's behavior in their attributions (Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988).
Table 1.
Steps in the Fiske and Emery (1993) theory of mental control and exaggerated
social control.
Postulate/Step Related IV Related DV
1. Anxious people exper- manipulate or
ience intrusive thoughts measure anxiety
ask for thought
content
2. The intrusive thoughts manipulate thought test cognitive
reduce cognitive capacity suppression efforts performance
3. The intrusive thoughts manipulate thought ask how controllable
are uncontrollable suppression efforts thoughts are
Losing control over their
thoughts makes anxious
people feel control-
deprived
manipulate
perceived
mental control
Mental control depriva- manipulate
tion leads to control perceived
motivation mental control
Anxious people who
want to make their
environments seem
controllable cannot
use normal means, because
they lack cognitive space
add control
deprivation and
capacity
deprivation
7. The self is aversive, so manipulate or
anxious people's control measure anxiety
attempts are directed outward
8. Other people appear manipulate or
simpler and also easier to measure anxiety
control
ask about feelings
of control
test information
search or other
attempts at control
test for complexity
of impressions,
social control
attempts, use of
information
measure
aversiveness of
self-focus
measure perceptions
of or control of others
continued on next page
Table 1., continued
Postulate/Step Related IV Related DV
9. To an anxious person, manipulate or measure
others seem a good target measure anxiety attempted control
for control attempts of others
6And people have less memory for what another person said right before their
own turn to speak, presumably because they are anxiously or at least busily
rehearsing what they plan to say (Bond, Pitre, & Van Leeuwen, 1991).
In relation to the present research, anxiety has been studied as a
distractor in person perception. For example, solos (people who believe they
are the only one of their gender or race in a group) are more preoccupied and
anxious about others' attention to them, and they remember less information
about others (Saenz & Lord, 1989). Threats to self-esteem (a major cause of
anxiety) cause people to differentiate the members of an outgroup less (Wilder
& Shapiro, 1989).
These experiments and the test anxiety literature (Sarason & Sarason,
1990) do indicate that anxious people are distracted by intrusive thoughts, and
that they show deficits in memory, differentiation, and cognitive performance.
Thus, the literature supports the idea that anxiety takes up mental capacity.
But capacity decrements are not the whole story. The capacity-control theory
predicts that control motivation, in addition to decreased capacity, contributes
to a desire for social control (and simpler impressions) in anxious people. I turn
to this topic next.
Control Decrements
The intrusive thoughts that anxious people experience are difficult to
control, especially as the thoughts become more emotional (Clark & de Silva,
1985; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984). Even non-anxious people have great
difficulty purposely suppressing thoughts (Wegner, 1989), particularly when
they are exciting (Wegner, Shortt, Blake, & Page, 1990). But anxious people
7report special difficulty in thought control (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, &
DePree, 1983).
We hypothesize that anxious people's unsuccessful attempts at
controlling their thoughts and feelings will make them feel control-deprived.
No research to date has measured how out of control people feel when they try
unsuccessfully to suppress thoughts. However, Pittman and Heller (1987)
suggest that experiencing negative, unexpected events or feeling a lack of
contingency between one's efforts and one's outcomes threatens people's
feelings of outcome control (prediction and influence over events). If these
events make people feel out of control, anxious people's unsuccessful attempts
at thought suppression probably have the same effect. One study that supports
our claim is by Kent and Gibbons (1987), who found that perceived lack of
thought control is strongly related to distress in anxious people, more so than
the frequency of their intrusive thoughts. The reported distress in this study is
perhaps a symptom of lost mental control.
Much research suggests that people who feel out of control usually seek
information to regain a sense of predictability and control (for a review, see
Pittman & Heller, 1987). For example, one study found that people who are
control-deprived in one situation use more information when they form
impressions of others in a second situation (Pittman & Pittman, 1980). In
addition, when people are dependent on each other for an important reward,
they lose sole control over their outcomes. As a result, they usually try to be
more accurate about their partners (D6pret & Fiske, 1993; Erber & Fiske, 1984;
Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990).
8So far, the reasoning suggests that anxious people's uncontrollable,
intrusive thoughts leave them feeling out of control. Control deprivation in
nonanxious people usually leads to control motivation, reflected in active
information searching. Will the control deprivation of anxious people also lead
to control motivation? The answer does appear straightforward, and we do
believe that anxiety will lead to control motivation. But we must address a
potential problem in the reasoning first.
The problem lies in this distinction: All of the control deprivation
paradigms mentioned in Pittman and Heller (1987) concern outcome control
(control over one's rewards and punishments, not necessarily from another
person). But the control deprivation in anxiety concerns mental control (control
over one's thoughts and feelings). We believe that mental control deprivation
will result in control motivation similar to that in outcome control deprivation,
but the claim is speculative. Perhaps the best evidence comes from Pittman and
Pittman's (1980) study. There, outcome-control deprivation in one situation
(non-contingent feedback on a concept formation task) transferred to an
unrelated situation (an impression-formation task). This study suggests that
control motivation is general, indicating it could result from lost mental control
as well. Because efforts at thought suppression often backfire, making people
focus on the very thought they are trying to suppress, attempts at thought
suppression mimic non-contingent feedback sihiations: in both, people's efforts
are unrelated to their success. If so, feeling deprived of mental control might
also motivate effortful impression formation. However, a direct test of this
hypothesis is clearly necessary.
9How Capacity Decrements and Control Decrements Might Work Tngpfrhpr in
Anxious People
The last two sections established that anxious people are likely to
experience a capacity decrement and a control decrement. These two
characteristics make competing predictions for impression formation. People
who are short on capacity are likely to form more simple impressions of others
because they lack the capacity to be complex. People who are control-deprived
are likely to form more complex, or at least more effortful, impressions of
others, because they are concerned about regaining prediction and control.
Anxious people are caught in between: they want to regain control, but they
lack the resources to do so. A person with this combination of tendencies is
likely to want information about others, but not attend to it or use it in
meaningful ways. The studies reported here cross mental control deprivation
with cognitive busyness in nonanxious people to test this hypothesis.
Our research is designed to indicate whether or not simple control
deprivation and cognitive busyness are sufficient to simulate an anxious
person's impression formation processes. Will nonanxious people who are both
control-deprived and distracted act similar to anxious people? We predict that
both anxious people and simulated-anxious people will say they want more
information about others, but will not use it in complex ways. They will form
simple impressions of others rather than complex, integrated ones. They may
be more likely to categorize people instead of individuating them.
An additional prediction the capacity-control theory makes is that
anxious people respond to their lack of mental control and mental capacity by
10
simplifying others in an attempt at social control. Anxious people substitute the
control of others, whom they perceive to be more simple, distant, and
controllable, for controlling the self, which they perceive to be more complex,
aversive, and uncontrollable. The two experiments in this report addresses this
part of the theory as well, as will be explained below. But first, I review the
reasons that anxious people may want to control others.
There are several social cognitive reasons why anxious people, short on
capacity and in need of control, might prefer others as their objects of control.
First, in anxiety, the self is the source of negative states, and anxious people
may find attention toward the self particularly aversive (Baumeister, 1990,
Higgins, 1987). Anxious people should find it more pleasant to direct their
attention outward than to focus it on themselves.
Second, other people seem easier to control than the self because
feedback from attempts at social control is more delayed, indirect, and
ambiguous, whereas the anxious person's efforts at mental control give
immediate (and often unsuccessful) feedback Thus, unsuccessful attempts at
mental control are immediately noticed, whereas unsuccessful attempts at social
control can be reinterpreted or ignored.
Third, people have less complex concepts of others compared to
themselves (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, Chapters 4 & 6), so other people seem simpler
at the outset. The capacity decrements of anxiety accentuate a simple view of
others: Categories are likely to be the tools of a distracted mind (Gilbert, 1989;
Wilder & Shapiro, 1989). If anxious people are motivated to control their
environment, another person who appears simple may seem a easy target.
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Wilder & Shapiro, 1989). If anxious people are motivated to control their
environment, another person who appears simple may seem a easy target.
We predict that anxious people and simulated-anxious people will report
a desire to control their partners. They may report wanting their partners to
follow their advice or act in expected ways. In these two studies, partner
control is measured with a self-report scale, not behavioral measures. Although
such behavioral measures are important, the focus of these two studies was on
the categorical impressions that mediate the path from anxiety to social control.
The capacity-control theory is complemented by Baumeister's theory of
escape from negative self awareness, which he uses to explain masochistic
sexual behavior (Baumeister, 1989), suicide (Baumeister, 1990), and binge eating
(Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991). One step in Baumeister's theory states that in
order to escape negative affect (including anxiety), people narrow their
cognitive views and "deconstruct" rational thinking. Cognitive narrowing
results in concrete thinking and cognitive rigidity, including categorical
thinking. Baumeister's theory complements ours because it implies that anxious
people may find categories easier to handle (step 8 in Table 1).
Overview of Studies
To date, no parts of the capacity-control theory have been empirically
tested. The purpose of the present studies is to begin doing so. These shidies
focus on the combined effects of control motivation and cognitive load (step 6
in Table 1). It only indirectly tests two mediating hypotheses, namely,
that loss
of mental control leads to control deprivation and control motivation (steps
4
and 5 in Table 1). The shidies use a brief self-report measure to confirm
steps
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that are already well-established in other research, namely, that anxious people
experience uncontrollable, intrusive thoughts that take up cognitive capacity
(steps 1, 2, & 3 in Table 1). The studies also do not directly test the social
cognitive reasons why anxious people might find others to be appealing targets
for control (steps 7, 8, & 9 in Table 1). Subsequent research may address
neglected steps.
In the two studies presented here, pairs of subjects expected to work
together on various activities. They read information about each other that
contained both consistent and inconsistent statements. Then they wrote brief
essays about their partners and rated them on various traits. They answered
questions about how much control they felt over their thoughts and feelings,
how distracted they were by their thoughts and feelings, and how much
control they felt over their outcomes in the experiment. They also answered
questions about how much control they wanted over their partners' behavior,
and about how much information they wanted about their partners.
Both studies involved five groups of subjects. One group of subjects,
selected for high trait anxiety, served as an external comparison group, the fifth
cell of a 2 X 2 + 1 design. Of the remaining subjects, half were mentally
control-deprived and half were cognitively busy, forming a 2 (control-deprived
or not) X 2 (cognitively busy or not) design.
As measures of person perception, we measured subjects' attention to
information from their partners (reading times), the complexity or simplicity of
their essays, how much of the information from their partners they actually
used in their descriptive essays, and the extremity of their ratings of their
13
partners. We assumed that more polarized ratings (on bipolar scales) indicated
that subjects did not modify their judgments with inconsistent information,
suggesting simplicity.
Subjects in Study 1 were interdependent: They were told they could win
a prize if they worked well with their partners. In previous research, outcome
dependency has been shown to motivate subjects to pay more attention to their
partners (Erber & Fiske, 1984), presumably because subjects no longer have sole
control over their own outcomes. Interdependence, therefore, can also be seen
as a control deprivation operationalization. Subjects in Study 2 were not
interdependent, to investigate the pure effects of mental control deprivation
(without outcome dependency).
Hypotheses
We expected the nonanxious subjects who are both mentally control-
deprived and cognitively busy to resemble our anxious comparison group.
Compared to subjects who are neither control-deprived nor busy, these two
groups will make simpler impressions of their partners and indicate that they
are interested in controlling them. They will pay less attention to inconsistent
information about their partners, will write simpler essays using less of the
information, and will polarize their ratings of their partners. They will report
that they would like a lot of information about their partners, but they will not
use the information they have in meaningful ways.
Two orthogonal contrasts are the most direct and theoretically interesting
test in the study. Our first prediction is that the both control-deprived and
cognitively busy cell (-2) will be similar to the anxious cell (-2) and different
14
from the other cells. Of those, the only busy cell (-1) will show a decrease in
impression accuracy and complexity but not as much. The control-deprived cell
(+3) will show an increase in these variables compared to the baseline cell (+2).
These contrast weights take into account the predicted effects of busyness and
control deprivation by themselves, as well as the combined effect we predict
when people are both busy and control-deprived. Our second prediction is that
the both control-deprived and cognitively busy cell and the anxious comparison
cell will be the same, resulting in respective contrast weights of
-1, +1, 0, 0, 0.
CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1
Method
Overview
Pairs of female subjects participated in an experiment about "working
apart and together on activities" and thought they could win a prize for
worldng well with their partners. Subjects first answered 8 interview questions
about themselves, as an introduction for their partner (their answers were never
actually shown to their partners). Subjects then spent 4 minutes trying to not
think about a white bear, receiving feedback that their performance was normal
or that they were having trouble doing the task. Subjects read answers to the 8
interview questions, presumably from their partners, but actually false answers.
Then they wrote a short essay about their impressions of their partners based
on the interview answers, rated her on several traits, and answered questions
about their strategies for working together, their level of mental distraction, and
the amount of information they wanted from their partners. Subjects then
performed two tasks working together. Busy subjects counted beeps from an
audio tape throughout most of the experiment. Materials from primary
experimental tasks are contained in Appendix A.
Design
The design was a 2 (mental control-deprived or not) X 2 (cognitively
busy or not) + 1 (anxious), 5-cell design. Anxious subjects, the comparison
group, were not crossed with control deprivation or cognitive busyness
because
15
16
they are expected to experience both of these naturally, so theoretically anxiety
and the two manipulations would be redundant.
Subjects
One hundred two female introductory psychology students at the
University of Massachusetts were run in 51 pairs. None of the pairs were
acquainted before the study. Of these, five subjects in the anxious condition
were omitted from all analyses because manipulation checks (self-ratings on
"anxious" and "calm") indicated that they were not anxious during the
experiment. In addition, four subjects were omitted because they volunteered
suspicion at the control deprivation manipulation. One subject was omitted
because she volunteered suspicion of the false partner information. Five
subjects who were originally assigned to the control-deprived/busy condition
were transferred to the only busy condition because they did not report any
thought intrusions on the control deprivation exercise (to be described shortly),
and thus it would have been unclear how the failure feedback would have
affected them. These five subjects were not significantly different from the
other busy subjects on any of the measures.
After omissions and transfers, 22 subjects were in the baseline condition,
25 were in the only busy condition, 16 in the only control-deprived condition,
15 in the busy and control-deprived condition, and 15 in the anxious condition.
Selection of Anxious Subjects
Anxious subjects were selected by their scores on the "state" scale of the
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorusch, &
Lushene, 1970), included as part of the general psychology prescreening pool
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administered at the beginning of the semester. Anxious subjects scored 2.70 or
higher on a 4-point scale; this represented the topmost 20% of the 120 women
who took the form of the prescreen that contained the scale. To be included,
anxious subjects also had to indicate agreement (3 or more on a 4-point scale)
with a majority of the items on a 6-item subscale, also on the prescreen. The
subscale included items such as: "How anxious would it make you feel to work
on a test with someone you've never met before, while someone evaluates how
you work together?" Subscale scores helped ensure that the women who
reported high trait anxiety would also be anxious in this particular lab situation.
Non-anxious subjects did not meet the high-anxiety criteria.
Room Arrangement
The partners sat at desks facing each other. A 1 foot plywood barrier
enabled subjects to see each others' faces but not anything their partners were
writing.
The female experimenter sat in a chair facing the partners. Two clip-on
microphones were taped to each side of her chair seat; each microphone was
plugged into a tape recorder.
Experimental Conditions
Each member of a given pair received identical treatment conditions.
That is, within a pair, both members were busy, control-deprived, both control-
deprived and busy, or neither control-deprived nor busy (the baseline group).
Similariy, both members received the same impression expectancy (either
hardworking or lazy). One exception to this rule involved the pairing of
anxious subjects with each other. Having an anxious partner might influence
18
subjects' reactions. For example, anxious subjects may display unusual
nonverbal behaviors. To avoid any confounding effects of having an anxious
partner with being an anxious subject, half of the anxious subjects worked with
other anxious subjects and half worked with non-anxious controls. This also
meant that half of the baseline subjects worked with each other and half with
anxious subjects.
Busyness Manipulation
. For the busy condition, the experimenter told
half of the non-anxious subjects the following:
You probably know that in the real world, people hardly ever devote all
their attention to one thing at a time. You're almost always distracted by
one thing or another~your neighbor's music, or your stomach growling-
so you usually have to do two or more things at once. We like to make
our experiments more like the real world by having people do more than
one thing in here. That way, we can better generalize our results to
people in the real world.
The experimenter then told them about the counting task. A tape recorder
played a tape of beeps at random intervals an average of 12 s apart. The
subjects counted each beep as they heard it. Subjects counted beeps during
every task in the experiment (starting after the white bear task; see procedure
below) except when oral instructions were given. At the end of each task in
the experiment, the experimenter paused the tape and subjects wrote down the
number of beeps they counted in that task. The tape began again after the
instructions for the next task.
Deprivation Manipulation
. Half of the nonanxious subjects were
randomly assigned to the control deprivation condition, adapted from Wegner,
et al. (1990). Near the beginning of the shidy, subjects were told:
For the next two minutes I'd like you each to write down your thoughts;
just whatever happens to be going through your head right now. But at
the same time I'd like you to try really hard to not think about a white
bear. Now, even though you're trying not to think of one, you might
happen to. So if you do happen to think of a white bear-like the word,
or the image, or something reminds you of it-just put a checkmark in
the margin. I'm going to have you do this for two minutes.
After subjects did the task for two minutes, the experimenter told them to stop,
leaned forward to look at their pages, and muttered, "I just have to take a
looL..." At this point, non-control-deprived subjects were told,
Okay, you guys are both doing fine. This is impossible to do, and most
people put a lot of checkmarks down. I need to get a total of four
minutes from everybody, so if you could just draw a line under where
you stopped, and start writing again below that line. I'll have you do it
again for two more minutes.
In contrast, in the control-deprived condition, the experimenter expressed some
disappointment, and looking from one subject's paper to the other, said.
Well, I don't want either of you to comment on this or say anything, but
since one of you is having some trouble, I think I'm going to have you
both just practice it again. Why don't you draw a line on your page and
you can do it again below the line. We just read somewhere that most
20
college students can go for four minutes without putting any
checkmarks, so try really hard NOT to think of a white bear.
After the second two minutes, the experimenter collected the subjects' pages.
Procedure
Subjects were told that they were participating in a study on how people
work together versus how they work apart. First they would do some activities
on their own, then they would get to know each other, and finally, they would
do a few activities together, as a pair. To make subjects interdependent, the
experimenter offered three prizes of $40 to three pairs. One $40 prize was for
the pair that did the best at the activities overall, and the two other prizes were
randomly drawn from the pairs who performed better than half the other pairs.
(In actuality, all prizes were awarded by lottery at the completion of the study.)
After introducing the experiment, the experimenter asked subjects'
permission to tape-record the session. She explained that the microphones were
attached to the chair because "we used to put them right on your desks in front
of you, but we found that it made some people uncomfortable. So we moved
them." All subjects agreed to be taped.
As their first task, subjects were asked to introduce themselves to their
partners by answering eight questions about themselves and university life.
The questions were printed on half-sheets of paper, paperclipped together. The
experimenter wrote a large "R" and "L" in the top corner of the first pages,
explaining that they stood for "right" and "left," respectively. When subjects
finished, the experimenter collected the questionnaires and placed them in her
lap.
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Next, the experimenter explained that the subjects would be doing all of
the individual tasks first and working together later. The first such task was
the mental control, or white bear task, which contained the control deprivation
manipulation.
After the mental control task, subjects completed Epstein's Feelings
Checklist (Epstein, 1979). The checklist contains groups of emotions to which
subjects respond on 7-point bipolar scales. Before they received the feelings
checklist, busy subjects were introduced to the beep counting task, and told
that the checklist was a way to practice counting the beeps before the more
important "getting acquainted" part. Non-busy subjects, of course, did not
receive such instruction.
While subjects completed the checklist, the experimenter secretly
exchanged the actual answers the subjects gave to the eight interview questions
with two previously prepared, standard sets of interview answers.
Next, the experimenter introduced the "getting acquainted" part. As she
handed subjects their partners' answers to the introductory questions (which
were actually the standard answers), she explained, "because the two of you
will be working together for a prize later, you should use this information to
get to know your partner a little bit." The experimenter casually watched the
subjects read the interviews, and as each subject turned a page, she
unobtrusively tapped the microphone (taped to her chair) that corresponded to
that subject. Later, a timer, blind to experimental condition, timed the seconds
between the taps on the tape to obtain a measure of attention for each page of
the interview.
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Interview Content. The first two pages of the interview set up an
expectancy about the partner as either hard-working and smart or lazy and
dull. (For example, the hard-working partner reported studying 20 hours a
week, whereas the lazy partner shidied 3 hours a week.) The remaining six
answers contained three statements that were pretested to be consistent with
the hard-working expectancy but inconsistent with the lazy expectancy (e.g., "I
don't usually have time to go to movies during school because of homework")
and three statements that were that are inconsistent with the hard-working
expectancy but consistent with the lazy expectancy (e.g., "the best part about
UMass is the big classes-nobody ever calls on you and they don't care if you
skip"). Within each cell, half of the subjects (randomly assigned) received the
hard-working expectancy and half received the lazy expectancy. Exact wording
of the interview is contained in Appendix B.
After reading the partner information, subjects completed a packet of
questions about their impressions of their partners. The experimenter told them
that their answers to the questions would not be shown to their partners and,
to emphasize this, gave each an envelope in which to seal her completed
packet. On the first page of the packet, each subject wrote an essay paragraph
about her impressions about her partner. Subjects took as much or as little time
as they wanted to complete the essay paragraph. On the next page of the
packet, subjects rated their partners on 11 traits (e.g., smart, loyal, lazy, crabby)
on 7-point scales anchored from "not at all" to "extremely." Then they answered
nine questions concerning their confidence about doing well at the activities
and about how much they wanted to control their partners (e.g., "It would be
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better if my partner takes my advice when we work together"). The next five
questions asked how much control they presently felt over their own thoughts
and feelings and how much they were presently distracted by irrelevant
thoughts. Finally, two questions asked subjects to indicate how much
information they considered necessary to form a good impression of their
partners (see the appendix for the specific questions).
After completing the packets, subjects were introduced to the activities
working together. For the first task, alternative uses, subjects were given 2 min
to help each other think of uses for an automobile tire that were different from
the objects' common use. This activity has been used as a measure of divergent
thinking in previous work (Jackson & Messick, 1967), and was intended to
address the degree to which subjects think in rigid versus flexible ways. While
pairs worked together, the experimenter unobtrusively recorded how many uses
each subject suggested. The second task was a verbal one in which subjects
worked together to come up with shorter words that could be spelled with the
letters in the word "Washington" (Estroff & Nowicki, 1992). Again, the
experimenter recorded the contribution of each subject.
Finally, subjects were given a brief questionnaire asking what they
considered to be important in the experiment. They first answered two free-
response questions ("what part did you try hardest to do well on?" and "what
part did you try least hard to do well on?") and then rated the importance of
each individual experiment task (e.g., making an accurate impression of the
partner, writing a good essay about the partner, doing well at the activities,
etc.).
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At the end of the shidy, each pair of subjects was carefully debriefed and
probed for suspicion. Anxious subjects were never told why they had been
selected to participate.
Essay Coding
Subjects' essays were coded for three main elements. All coders were
blind to the experimental conditions of the subjects whose essays they were
coding. First, coders counted the number of words and the number of
sentences in each essay as an index of verbal productivity (e.g., Strauman &
Higgins, 1987). Second, a coder recorded how much of the information from
the hard-working or lazy interview answers subjects used in their essays. If a
part of the interview was mentioned, the coder classified it into one of three
categories: a.) mentioned the piece of information in accurate detail (e.g., "she
said she likes the big classes because you can skip"); b.) mentioned only the
gist of the information (e.g., "she likes to skip classes"); or c.) mentioned the
information but incorrectly (e.g., "she likes big classes because she likes meeting
other students").
Third, all essays were coded for complexity by the author and one other
coder using a coding scheme developed by Woike and Aronoff (1992) (see also
Woike, 1989). Sentences and sentence fragments could be coded with one or
more of 9 categories. Category scores were later summed into two subscores as
well as a total complexity score. The differentiation subscore comprised the
number of new ideas mentioned in the essay and statements that restrict the
meaning of an aspect, point out a contrast between aspects, or indicate a
relative comparison between aspects. The integration subscore comprised
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statements that extend the meaning of an aspect, make an inference, or provide
evidence for a conclusion and statements that point out similarities, show causal
relationships between aspects, or make general integrative statements about the
person or essay as a whole. The total complexity score was the sum of the
differentiation and integration subscores.
Before coding the essays in this shidy, the two coders trained to 85%
agreement on essays from a pilot shidy. Then each coder scored 61 of this
stud/s 102 essays so that 20 essays were scored by both; inter-rater agreement
on these 20 essays was 80%.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Anxiety
. Anxious subjects' mean responses to the Epstein feelings
checklist were compared to the combined mean of the other four groups. This
test incorporates the same weights as a planned contrast (weighting the anxious
group +4 and the other four groups -1) but tests against a more conservative
error term. As expected, anxious subjects were more anxious (M's = 3.60 vs.
2.51; t(91) = 2.45, p < .025) and less calm (M's = 3.47 vs. 4.69; t(91) = -2.76, p <
.01). Anxious subjects also reported being less happy (M's = 3.73 vs. 4.85; t(91)
= 2.77, g < .01) and less alert (M's = 2.87 vs. 4.36; t(91) = 3.37, p < .01).
Anxious subjects were not more frightened (M's = 2.07 vs. 2.10, n.s.).
Busvness . Self-reports of distraction were tested using a 2 (busy or not)
X 2 (control-deprived or not) between subjects ANOVA. As expected, busy
subjects reported feeling more distracted (M's = 4.08 vs. 2.61; F(l,74) = 13.10, p
<
.01). Unexpectedly, they also reported being happier (M's = 5.18 vs. 4.50;
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F(l,74) = 4.29, p < .05) and more alert (M's = 4.78 vs. 4.08; F(l,74) = 3.30, p =
.07).
The number of beeps that busy subjects reported counting was compared
to the actual number of beeps played. Busy subjects' error rate was 6%,
suggesting that the task was challenging enough to influence capacity yet not
so difficult to cause subjects to give up. The acceptable error rate in other
distraction experiments has been 15% (see Gilbert et al., 1988).
Mental Control Deprivation
. No direct manipulation checks were
included for mental control deprivation. However, one way to test whether the
feedback was effective is to test if control-deprived (CD) subjects put fewer
checkmarks the second 2 mins (after the feedback to try harder). They did (M's
first two mins: CD = 3.32, non-CD = 2.72; second two min: CD = .871, non-CD
= 2.51; interaction F (1,76) = 18.17, p < .001). This interaction qualifies a main
effect for trial (F(l,76) = 25.74, p < .01). As another ad hoc check, control-
deprived subjects reported being marginally more distracted (M's = 3.74 vs 3.11;
F(l,74) = 2.80, p < .10). However, this effect accompanies the busyness main
effect and probably reflects only the responses of the control-deprived/busy
group; only-control-deprived subjects were not sigruficantiy more distracted
than the baseline group (M's = 2.94 vs. 2.36). No other differences emerged on
the feelings checklist.
Hardworking Versus Lazy Expectancy . Subjects' ratings of their partiiers
on the traits "hardworking" and "smart" were summed and ratings on "lazy" and
"irresponsible" were summed to serve as manipulation checks for the
hardworking and lazy expectancies. Subjects receiving the hardworking
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expectancy rated their partners as more hardworking than did subjects
receiving the lazy expectancy (M's = 6.26 and 4.21, respectively; F(l,70) = 8.01,
P < .01), and subjects receiving the lazy expectancy rated their partners as more
lazy than did subjects receiving the hardworking expectancy (M's = 3.42 and
1.86, respectively; F(l,70) = 28.69, p < .01).
Impression Formation Strategies
The main hypotheses in this study were that anxious subjects and
control-deprived/busy (CD/B) subjects would a) want more information about
their partners but b) would not use the information about their partners in
complex ways, and c) would express a desire to control their partners. The
dependent variables measuring impression formation included subjects'
attention to information, their self-reports of the amount of information they
wanted, the complexity and length of their essays, the extent to which they
mentioned information from the partner interview in their essays, their ratings
of their partners on several traits, and their self-reports of wanting to control
their partners. Analyses on these impression formation variables were first
done as 2 (busy or not) x 2 (control-deprived or not) x 2 (hardworking
expectancy or lazy expectancy) between subjects ANOVAs, excluding anxious
subjects. Planned contrasts included the anxious subjects, using the error term
from a 5 (condition) x 2 (expectancy) ANOVA.
In this section, I will present results that clearly support the specific
hypotheses or that give null effects on dependent variables relevant to the
hypotheses. Several effects obtained that were not predicted and do not
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specifically support the hypotheses but that are interesting nonetheless. 1 will
present these in a following section.
Information Seeking
.
Being mentally control-deprived or anxious should
have led subjects to seek more information about their partners. Anxious
subjects tended to report wanting more information on the self-report measure
(M's: anxious = 10.07, baseline = 9.52, only-B = 8.54, only-CD = 9.20, CD/B =
8.29; F(4,79) = 2.28, p = .07). However, this tendency did not hold for control-
deprived subjects, who did not report wanting more information than non-
control-deprived subjects (M's CD = 8.76, non-CD = 9.00, n.s.).
Information seeking can also be measured by the amount of attention
subjects paid to the information from their partners while they were reading it:
More attention (hence, longer reading times) may reflect a desire to get more
information about the partner. Unfortunately, over 1/3 of the attention data
were lost due to a tape recorder malfunction, and no effects on the attention
variables were significant due to very low power. Means for the total time
spent reading the essay suggest that, counter to the predictions and the self-
report results, anxious subjects spent less time reading the information than the
other groups (M's: anxious = 68.59, baseline = 74.47, only-B = 75.13, only-CD
= 75.45, CD/B = 74.03; n.s.). Of course, this result is equivocal because of
incomplete data.
Impression Complexity . Three types of complexity subscores were
compared: differentiation, integration, and total complexity (which is the sum of
differentiation and integration). All complexity subscores are very highly
correlated with the number of words subjects wrote (r's = .57 to .86).
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Therefore, to separate the effect of verbal productivity from achial differences in
complexity, subjects' complexity scores were divided by the number of words in
their essays. Scores were then multiplied by a constant to make them greater
than 1. Because of these transformations, the complexity scores themselves are
uninterpretable but differences between the groups on complexity are
meaningful.
Findings from the total complexity subscore perfectly support the
hypotheses. A busy by control
-deprived interaction was significant (F(l,70) =
4.44, p < .05; M's baseline = 16.05, only-B = 15.98, only-CD = 17.46, CD/B =
14.96. Anxious group M = 15.01.). The planned contrast weights on each of
the means (weights +2, -2, +3, -1, -2, respectively) was significant (F(l,87) =
8.15, p < .01) and the contrast comparing the anxious group to the CD/B group
was, as predicted, nonsignificant (F(l,87) < 1.0). The residual from the contrasts
was nonsignificant (F(2,87) < 1.0), as predicted. These results suggest that
mental control deprivation alone increased complexity, but when control
deprivation was combined with cognitive busyness, it dramatically decreased
complexity-more than just busyness alone. And as predicted, anxious subjects
resembled the control-deprived/busy subjects. These two groups were the least
complex of the five. (This busy x control-deprived interaction qualified a main
effect for busyness, F(l,70) = 4.68, p < .05; M's busy = 15.6, not busy = 16.6.)^
Analyses on the integration subscore showed no differences (all F's n.s.).
And results for the differentiation subscore are largely redundant with the
results for the total complexity score. The same busy x control-deprived
interaction was significant (F(l,70) = 5.14, p < .05; M's: baseline = 11.4, only-B
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= 12.2, only-CD = 13.3, CD/B = 11.0. Anxious group M = 11.1.). The pattern
here is very similar to the results for total complexity with the exception that
the only busy group mean is now higher than baseline; however, the only
control-deprived group used the most differentiation and the anxious and the
control-deprived plus busy groups used the least. Because of the higher mean
in the busy group, the planned contrast involving all five groups failed to reach
significance (F(l,83) = 1.52, n.s.). But the anxious group and the control-
deprived/busy groups are not significantly different, as the theory predicts
(F(l,83) < 1). The residual was not significant (F(2,83) = 1.94, p < .25). As in
the total complexity results, a control deprivation by expectancy interaction
obtained (F(l,70) = 10.41, p < .01), with the same pattern of means. Because
the total complexity score is comprised of the subscores for differentiation and
integration, this set of findings suggests that the total complexity results are
mainly reflecting the amount of differentiation, not the amount of integration,
subjects used.
Use of the Interview Information . Results on how often subjects
mentioned the information from the interview in their essays did not follow the
hypothesized pattern. All subjects were more likely to mention the information
accurately than to mention only its details or to mention it inaccurately (F(2,166)
= 14.78, p < .01). And there was an uninterpretable interaction involving the
anxious group (F(l,83) = 2.77, p < .05), such that anxious subjects mentioned
inconsistent information more in the hardworking expectancy. This effect
qualified a main effect for condition and a condition x expectancy interaction
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(Fs (4,83) = 3.28 & 4.21, g's < .025). One other result from this dependent
measure is presented in a following section.
Desire to Control Partner. We predicted that the anxious and control-
deprived/busy subjects would want to control their partners more than the
other groups. Five self-report items combined into an index (alpha = .78)
addressed this hypothesis. No significant effects obtained.
Other Impression Findings
Some patterns of findings that emerged in Study 1 were not specifically
predicted by the capacity-control theory; still, they are not inconsistent with the
theory and are interpretable in terms of previous research. I will present those
findings here.
Busyness Made Ratings of Positive Traits More Extreme . When they
rated their partners on the positive traits "hardworking" and "smart," busy
subjects made more extreme ratings than non-busy subjects. (M's: Busy
subjects: hardworking expectancy = 6.67, lazy expectancy = 3.98; Not-busy
subjects: hardworking = 5.93, lazy = 4.53; F(l,70) = 13.56, p < .01). Given that
subjects read information that was both consistent and inconsistent with their
expectancies, this result suggests that non-busy subjects probably modify their
trait ratings accordingly. A capacity decrement, as seen in busy subjects, seems
to interfere with this process, causing polarization, a result consistent with
Gilbert et al. (1988). Anxious subjects' scores (M's hardworking = 5.83, lazy =
3.78) were midway between the busy and not-busy groups, not clearly
matching either group.
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Mental Control Deprivation Made Ratings of Negative Traits I.egs
Extreme. On ratings of 'lazy" and "irresponsible/' subjects in the conti-ol-
deprived groups made more moderate ratings than non-control-deprived
groups. Scores show less polarization in the CD group (M's CD: hardworking
expectancy = 2.03, lazy expectancy = 2.94; Non-CD hardworking = 1.76, lazy
= 3.77; F(l,70) = 4.99, p < .05). Thus it appears that mental control deprivation
caused subjects to incorporate inconsistent information more in their ratings on
'lazy." This result is consistent with previous work showing more effortful
attributions in control-deprived groups (e.g., Pittman & Pittman, 1980), and also
fits in with control-deprived subjects' special attention to negative information
in this study, which is discussed shortiy. Anxious subjects' scores (M's:
hardworking = 2.50, lazy = 3.61) are closest to the control-deprived group,
perhaps reflecting the control deprivation component in anxiety.
Control-deprived Subjects Rated Filler Traits in Line With the
Inconsistent Information . The four traits, "hardworking," "smart," 'lazy," and
"irresponsible," were embedded in a list that included 7 filler traits. 1 did not
expect to find any differences on the filler traits because they were unrelated to
the information that subjects read about their partners. However, some
differences did emerge. Filler traits with a positive valence ('likable,"
"outgoing," 'loyal," "friendly," and "honest") were summed and analyzed
separately from filler traits with a negative valence ("crabby" and "nervous") but
parallel effects emerged.
The effects involve differences between the control-deprived and the
non-control-deprived subjects. Non-control-deprived subjects show a "halo"
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effect on the filler traits, rating them more in line with the consistent
information, whereas control-deprived subjects showed the opposite effect,
rating the filler traits more in line with the inconsistent information (M's for
negative fillers: non-CD: hardworking expectancy = 2.16, lazy expectancy =
2.89; CD: hardworking expectancy = 2.63, lazy expectancy = 1.91; F of
interaction (1,70) = 7.82, p < .01; M's for positive fillers: non-CD: hardworking
expectancy = 5.51, lazy expectancy = 4.95; CD: hardworking expectancy = 5.21,
lazy expectancy = 5.49; F of interaction (1,70) = 8.22, p < .01). Therefore,
control-deprived subjects seem to be using the filler traits to reflect the
inconsistent information they read. Interpreted this way, the result is
compatible with previous findings of more effortful processing in control-
deprived subjects (Pittman & Heller, 1987). Of course, here the control
deprivation is mental, not outcome, control, as in previous work-
Anxious subjects appeared to show the "halo" effect pattern of non-CD
subjects, but only on the positive fillers (M's hardworking expectancy = 5.17,
lazy expectancy = 4.47). On negative fillers their ratings did not differ (M's
hardworking = 2.83, lazy = 3.00) and thus they do not resemble either of the
two groups.
Subjects Focused on Negative Information, Especially When They Were
Control-deprived
.
Negative information about one's partner can be threatening
when one is dependent on the person for a prize. In fact, all subjects in this
study tended to mention the lazy information more in their essays, regardless of
expectancy (F(l,70) = 3.05, p < .09; M's: mentions of lazy info = .86, mentions
of hardworking info = .45). But subjects who were control-deprived seem to
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have expended special effort processing negative information. As previously
reported, CD subjects used more complexity when they wrote about partners
they thought were lazy, compared to when they wrote about partners they
thought were hardworking. Also mentioned previously, CD subjects were more
moderate in their judgments of the negative traits, "lazy" and "irresponsible."
These two findings are complemented by a pattern of effects revealing that the
only-CD group wrote a much higher number of words in the negative
expectancy compared to the other groups. (These effects included a main effect
for busyness, a main effect for expectancy, a busy x expectancy interaction, and
a CD x expectancy interaction (F's(l,70) between 5.75 and 9.40, all ps < .01). All
four of these effects seem to be addressing the deviant cell in the CD-only, lazy
expectancy cell: M = 102.2; all other cells range from 53.4 to 86.7). Therefore, in
general, subjects seem to mention negative information more in their essays.
And when subjects are control-deprived and receive a negative expectancy, they
may think in complex ways, write more about their partners (if they are not
distracted), and make more moderate judgments of their partners on laziness.
(Anxious subjects, like control-deprived subjects, wrote longer essays about lazy
partners: M's = 98.0 vs. 80.1.)
Anxious Subjects Write the Most Words But Use the Least Complexity .
Anxious subjects wrote the longest essays of any of the five groups (M = 91.2,
other groups ranged from 58.3 to 81.3; F(4,83) = 4.14, p < .01). But when their
essays are controlled for words, they are the least complex (see results for total
complexity above). The high number of words in the anxious group fits with
Strauman and Higgins (1987) who found that anxious people talked much more
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than non-anxious people. Our findings add that although anxious people are
using a lot of words, the content of what they write is not very complex. The
specific test of this effect, a homogeneity of slopes test (regressing complexity
on number of words for each group), failed to reach significance, however.
Intrusive Thoughts in Anxious Subjects
The five self-report items measuring degree of thought control (alpha =
.83) revealed a main effect for condition (F(4,83) = 3.25, p < .025). Anxious
subjects (M = 3.76) and the 2 busy groups (M's: only-B = 3.87, CD/B = 3.53)
indicated more trouble v^th thought control than non busy groups (baseline =
2.55, only-CD = 3.10). In a post-hoc analysis, the scale was divided into two
subscales, with three items measuring thought distraction (e.g., "In the past few
moments, have you been distracted by thoughts or images about something
other than this experiment?") and two items measuring control of distracting
thoughts (e.g., "Presently, are you concerned about not being able to control
bothersome thoughts or worries?"). This division showed a main effect for
question type, such that subjects reported more thought distraction than trouble
controlling thoughts (F(l,88) = 21.46, p < .001). Of greater interest, a condition
x subscale interaction (F(4,88) = 2.91, p < .05) suggested that busy groups felt
distracted by thoughts (M's: baseline = 2.59, only-B = 4.44, only-CD = 3.43,
CD/B = 3.87) but could control them (M's: baseline = 2.50, only-B = 3.02, only-
CD = 2.59, CD/B = 3.03). Anxious subjects were also distracted (M = 3.89) but
were most likely of all the groups to report having trouble controlling their
thoughts (M = 3.57). This result is consistent both with the theory and also
with previous research finding that anxious subjects' distress is related mainly
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to the uncontrollability of their thoughts (not to their content or frequency;
Borkovec et al., 1983).
Other Measures
Confidence. Anxious subjects tended to be less confident about doing
well at the activities and winning the prize (F(4,83) = 3.41, p < .025; M's:
anxious = 4.5, baseline = 5.7, only-B = 5.4, only-CD = 6.1, CD/B = 5.5).
Performance on the Activities
. No effects emerged for subjects'
performance on the word-find activity. The only effect on the alternative uses
task showed that busy subjects tended to think of fewer uses than non-busy
subjects (M's: busy = 3.43, not-busy = 4.24; F(l,70) = 3.03, p = .09).
Importance of Impression Formation to Busy Subjects . The brief
questionnaire in which subjects rated the importance of each activity was
intended to test whether the effects of busyness on impressions were caused not
by distraction, but by busy subjects finding the beep counting task to be more
important than the impression task. Paired t-tests involving only subjects in the
busy groups compared the importance of counting the beeps (M rating = 4.50)
to the various impression activities. Reading the partner's answers (M = 6.0)
and working cooperatively with the partner (M = 6.43) were judged more
important than counting beeps (^8(41) = 4.12 and 5.29, respectively, p's < .01).
Writing a complex, accurate description of the partner (M = 3-88) was judged
equally important (t(41) = -1.35, n.s.). Thus the effects that the busyness
manipulation had on impression formation cannot be attributed to a demand
effect of subjects finding the busyness task more important; these effects are
more likely to be due to distraction.
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Effects of Having an Anxious Partner . Did having an anxious partner
have any special effect on subjects' feelings or impressions? To test this, 2
(subject: anxious or not) x 2 (pair type: matched or mixed) ANOVAs were
computed using only anxious and baseline subjects. An interaction, with
higher means in the matched/anxious and unmatched/baseline cells, would
show an effect of having an anxious partner. All main dependent variables and
the feelings scales were tested. The only effect that showed an interaction for
the relevant diagonal was subjects' ratings of their partners on the combined
trait score for 'lazy" and "irresponsible" (F(l,33) = 3.38, g = .075). Subjects with
anxious partners tended to rate them as more lazy (M's: anxious partner:
baseline subjects = 3.25, anxious subjects = 3.62; non-anxious partner: baseline
subjects = 2.62, anxious subjects = 2.64). Having an anxious partner, then,
does not seem to cause subjects to feel differently or behave differently on most
of the dependent variables. But subjects with anxious partners may have
detected some nonverbal cues that caused them to rate their partners somewhat
more negatively. Interestingly, subjects with anxious partners did not rate them
as being more "nervous."
Discussion
Support for the Theory
The capacity-control theory received mixed support in Study 1. Many of
the patterns, though complex, are encouraging for future research. Complexity
results clearly support the theory, with all five groups performing as predicted.
Control deprivation appears to increase complexity over baseline, whereas
control deprivation plus busyness decreases complexity-more than just
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busyness alone. The two components, control deprivation and cognitive load,
combined in a way that could not be predicted from the effects of either one of
these components alone: This is exactly the interaction pattern predicted.
Furthermore, anxious subjects used as little complexity as the control-
deprived/busy subjects, suggesting that the theory may have identified two
main components in anxiety.
Results from the self-report measure of thought control support steps 1
and 3 of the theory. Anxious subjects reported being distracted by intrusive
thoughts, supporting step 1. And they were more likely to say their thoughts
were uncontrollable, supporting step 3. This pattern nicely reflects two
components that operate in anxiety, according to the capacity-control theory.
Other dependent variables support some of the theory's predictions but
not others. The theory predicts that anxious people want to control other
people. This hypothesis was not supported, perhaps because of measurement
problems: Some of the items had low item variance and none were negatively
worded. Study 2 revises these self-report questions. Nevertheless, behavior
may be a better measure than self-report of controlling other people. The
present research intended primarily to find support for the impression part of
the theory; future research will need to identify and measure actual social
control behaviors in order to more cleariy support that part of the theory.
Although anxious subjects reported wanting more information, as
predicted, this was not true of control-deprived subjects in general or of control-
deprived/busy subjects in particular. The unfortunate loss of much of the
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attention data, however, means that this result is based solely on two self-report
questions.
Mental Control Deprivation
This study is one of the first to demonstrate that mental control
deprivation can motivate people to form more complex impressions. Research
already shows that outcome control deprivation causes increased attention and
more effortful attributions (see Pittman & Pittman, 1980; Fiske & Neuberg,
1990), but no research to date has linked mental control deprivation to this
general phenomenon. Mentally control-deprived subjects' trait ratings reflected
the inconsistent information they obtained from their partners, and they used
more complexity if they were not busy. Mentally control-deprived subjects
seemed especially likely to put forth effort when they had lazy partners,
suggesting that they are perhaps more sensitive to negative information.
Perhaps most compelling about this set of results is that the subjects were also
outcome control-deprived because they were interdependent: Effects of mental
control deprivation occurred in addition to an already motivated baseline. Thus
Study 1 demonstrated that mental control deprivation can be manipulated, and
that loss of mental control, like loss of outcome control, can lead to complex
person perception.
In sum, Shidy 1 holds promise for the capacity-control theory, but still
has its difficulties. The results, though encouraging, are not always consistent,
and some of the manipulations might have been cleaner. For example, the
control deprivation feedback did not work for some subjects because the white
bear task was too easy for them. The anxious sample in Shidy 1 (the top 20%
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of a small group of prescreened subjects) may not have been extreme enough to
capture hypothesized differences in processing. And the fact that all subjects
were motivated by interdependence may have obscured or complicated true
effects of the independent variables. Study 2 was designed with these and
other improvements in mind.
CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2
Introduction
The second experiment was intended to amplify, supplement, or replicate
several results from Study 1. First, changes in the operationalizations of the
main independent variables attempted to amplify the main results of Study 1.
For instance, the manipulation for mental control deprivation was improved. In
the first study, several subjects who had been assigned to the control
deprivation condition did not record any checkmarks during the white bear
task; these subjects had to be switched to the busy-only condition. To improve
this, the second study used a thought-control task that had a more uniformly
high baseline. In particular, subjects were asked to sit quietly and try not to
think of anything at all; if they did have a thought, they were to put down a
checkmark. Virtually all subjects put at least one checkmark on this task,
meaning that the control deprivation feedback was relevant for every subject in
that condition. A direct manipulation check was also included to test the effect
of the feedback on subjects' judgments of their success at the task.
The busyness manipulation differed as well. The new operationalization
required subjects to monitor random numbers for sets of three consecutive odd
numbers (N. MacCrae, personal communication, Sept. 1993). This task required
more vigilant attention than the beep-counting task; therefore, busy subjects in
Study 2 were probably more distracted. This might then cause larger
differences between the busy and the not-busy groups. Even if the new
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busyness task does not differ in distractedness, an alternative operationalization
of the distraction variable would support the generalizability of the busyness
findings.
Another significant change was that anxious subjects were selected from
a much larger group of prescreened subjects. The sample could select the top
5% on anxiety of over 1,000 women (compared to the top 20% of 120 women).
Therefore, anxious subjects in Study 2 may represent a significantly more
anxious population. Effects due to anxiety may therefore be much stronger.
Another difference meant to strengthen results in the second study was
the absence of interdependence instructions. All subjects in Study 1 were
interdependent; theoretically, they were all control-deprived. Any motivational
effects of the mental control deprivation, busyness, or anxiety had to act on top
of this already control-deprived baseline. Making subjects non-interdependent
might provide more room for the independent variables to show effects.
Additionally, a non-interdependent baseline could better show the pure effects
of mental control deprivation on impression judgments.
In addition to changes in the independent variables. Study 2 also
contained some new dependent variables. Several new performance measures
were added to capture some hypothesized processing differences in anxious
people. The study included a timed proofreading task, reasoning that anxious
people may be distracted from noticing small errors. (Performance on the
proofreading task could also show effects of the busyness and control
deprivation conditions.) The alternative uses and word-find tasks of Study 1
were replaced with a more complex task where subjects described abstract
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shapes (tangrams) to each other. Anxious subjects may show decrements on
more complex tasks, even when they show no differences in simpler tasks. A
surprise memory test was included in Shidy 2 to test the hypothesis that
anxious people show less incidental learning (learning material that is not
related to the task) compared to non-anxious people. Anxious people were
expected to recognize fewer previously encountered stimuli than non-anxious
people. Finally, Study 2 included an oral spelling test, reasoning that anxious
people might be distracted from keeping several letters in their working
memories.
Some significant but unpredicted results from Study 1 were tested a
priori in Study 2. First, more filler traits were included to try to replicate the
effect of mental control deprivation on ratings of these traits. Specifically, more
negative fillers were added to equate the number of positive and negative
fillers. Second, we attempted to replicate the finding that anxious people were
as distracted by intrusive thoughts as busy people, but were more bothered by
the uncontrollability of their thoughts. Items were constructed more specifically
and deliberately to measure these two components of intrusive thoughts.
Finally, the STAI was administered in the course of the experiment. This
test-retest method was intended as an additional manipulation check for
anxiety.
Of course. Study 2 also hoped to replicate the results for complexity that
obtained in Study 1. In general then, Shidy 2 was designed to strengthen many
of the manipulations in an attempt to find clearer support for the capacity-
control theory.
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Method
Subjects
Subjects were 106 female undergraduates who participated for extra
credit in their psychology classes. They were scheduled and run in 53 pairs.
All were unacquainted before the study. Women who scored 3.05 or higher on
the STAI (on a 4-point scale), administered as part of an inti'oductory
psychology prescreening questionnaire, were recruited as anxious subjects.
They represented the upper 5% of the 1076 women who took the prescreen. To
be included, anxious subjects also had to score above 2.25 on the subscale items
about whether they would be anxious in this particular laboratory situation.
Of the subjects, 9 were omitted from all analyses because they
volunteered suspicion about the control deprivation manipulation. Two were
omitted because they volunteered suspicion about the partner information. Five
subjects in the anxious condition were omitted from all analyses because their
scores on the second administration of the STAI (given at the end of the
experimental session) were lower than 2.75 and they reported being not anxious
(a value of 1) and being very calm (a value of 7) on the feelings checklist.
After omissions, 20 subjects remained in the baseline condition, 20 in the
only busy condition, 17 in the only control-deprived condition, 18 in the busy
and control-deprived condition, and 15 in the anxious condition.
Most procedures in Study 2 were similar to those in the first study but
there were several exceptions.
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Conditions
As in Study 1, pairs of subjects received the same experimental
conditions and the same expectancies. Again, half of the anxious subjects were
paired with one another and half were paired with non-anxious controls.
However, the mental control deprivation and cognitive busyness manipulations
were slightly changed.
Busyness Manipulation
.
Subjects in the busy condition listened to a tape
that played random numbers read (by a female research assistant) at regular 3 s
intervals. Whenever subjects heard three consecutive odd numbers they wrote
the numbers down on a separate page. As in Study 1, busy subjects did not
have to listen to the tape when the experimenter gave instructions.
Pretesting indicated that answering Likert-type scales labeled with
numerals was quite difficult for busy subjects. Therefore, all rating scales on
the experimental materials were replaced v^th 7 evenly spaced response boxes.
Control Deprivation Manipulation . Near the beginning of the
experiment, the experimenter explained.
We're interested in how people relax; how they clear their minds. So
what I'd like you to do is for the next couple of minutes, try hard not to
think about anything at all. Just try to empty your mind completely.
Now, no one can do this perfectly unless they're trained in meditation.
So I'm going to give you this sheet of paper, and if you do happen to
think of something-whether ifs a thought, an image, you're wondering
about something, you can't block something out, or anything like that-
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just put a checkmark on the page. But try really hard not to think of
anything. I'm going to have you do this for two minutes.
After subjects tried this task for two minutes, the experimenter leaned over to
look at their pages as in Shidy 1, and told the non-control-deprived subjects
that their performance was normal and that they would be doing another two
minutes in order to obtain a total of four minutes. She told the control-
deprived subjects, as in Study 1, that one of them was having some trouble so
they would have to practice it again. She added, "I think I'll have you draw a
line below your checkmarks, if any, and put any new checkmarks below that
line." After control-deprived subjects finished the second two minutes, the
experimenter looked at their pages and then at her watch, saying "well, we're
still not quite there yet, but we really have to keep moving. We should get on
to the next part."
At the bottom of the page on which subjects made their checkmarks
were two questions designed as a marupulation check for this false feedback
The two questions read, "How successful do you feel you were at this task?"
and "How successful do you feel most UMass students would be at this task?"
(both rated on a 7-point scale from "not at all" to "extremely"). All subjects
answered both questions after the four minutes of "meditation."
Procedure
Subjects arrived in pairs to participate in an experiment on working
together with a partner. The laboratory was set up identical to Shidy 1.
The
experimenter told them that they would be doing a few activities working
on
their own first, then they would get to know each other a little bit, and
then
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they would be working together on a couple of activities. No prizes were
offered in this study. All subjects agreed to be taped.
As in Study 1, subjects first answered the eight interview questions about
themselves. Then they did the "meditation" task, which served as the mental
control deprivation manipulation. Then all subjects spent one minute
proofreading a brief passage on pasta recipes. The passage was too long for
subjects to finish proofreading in the time allowed, so when time was called,
they drew a line indicating how far into the passage they had read. Then
subjects did a second proofreading passage on the same topic for one minute.
Between the two passages, however, busy subjects were instructed in the
busyness task, and were told that the second proofreading passage was an
opportunity to become comfortable with the tasL After the proofreading
passage, subjects completed Epstein's feelings checklist.
Then subjects read their partner's answers to the interview questions,
which were actually the standard interviews (with a hardworking or a lazy
expectancy) used in the first study (see Appendix B). After reading, they wrote
an essay paragraph about their impressions and completed trait ratings of 14
traits (3 more than in Study 1). They answered questions about their strategies
for working together that were based on questions used in Study 1; however,
some were worded negatively (unlike in Study 1) and two questions were
reworded to try to obtain more item variance. Next subjects answered six
questions about their feelings of mental control, again based on questions in
Shidy 1; however, they were designed a priori to test the two components,
distraction and controllability, separately. The last two questions in the packet.
48
as in Study 1, asked about how much information subjects wanted from their
partners.
After completing the packet, subjects worked together on two activities.
In the first, each pair member received a page with eight abstract figures
(tangrams) of intermediate difficulty (used in Hupet, Seron, & Chantraine,
1991). The partners had the same tangrams but in different orders. One
partner described the tangrams to her partner so she could correctly order them
on her page. The pairs worked on the tangram task for 90 s (not all pairs
finished describing all eight), and then switched roles with a new set of
tangrams. In the second activity, subjects read spelling words to each other.
Each tried to spell out loud a set of five words as quickly and accurately as
possible. The experimenter recorded each subjects spelling errors and total
time for spelling the five words.
After the spelling task, subjects received a page containing 16 tangram
figures. Eight were old tangrams (they were on one of the two sets subjects
previously worked from) and eight were foils. Working independently, subjects
circled the tangrams they remembered seeing before.
Finally, subjects completed the STAI. Busy subjects did not monitor the
numbers while they filled out the scale. Subjects were then carefully probed
for suspicion, debriefed, and dismissed.
Essays were coded for verbal productivity, information use, and
complexity using the same procedures as in Study 1. The two complexity
coders trained to 87% agreement; their agreement on the essays coded from this
shjdy was 82%.
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Results
Manipulation Checks
in Study 1, t-tests compared the anxious group to the mean
of the other four groups. As expected, anxious subjects were more anxious (M's
= 3.33 vs. 2.57; t(88) = 1.64, p = .lO)^ Anxious subjects were also less calm, as
predicted (M's = 3.73 vs. 4.47; t(88) =
-1.69, p = .09), and were more frightened
(M's = 3.13 vs. 2.01; t(88) = 3.05, p < .01). On the second administration of the
STAI, anxious subjects scored higher, as expected (M's = 3.09 vs. 2.04; t(88) =
9.10, p < .01).
Busyness
.
As expected, busy subjects reported feeling more distracted
(M's = 4.63 vs. 2.89; F(l,70) = 17.69, p < .01. Unexpectedly, they also reported
being more energetic (M's = 3.63 vs. 3.00; F(l,70) = 2.95, p = .09) and more
anxious (M's = 3.05 vs. 2.11; F(l,71) = 7.09, p < .025). These three findings all
reflect the increased vigilance necessary for this extraordinarily demanding tasL
Busyness Accuracy
.
Busy subjects monitored numbers on nine parts of
the experiment. Their average accuracy rate over the nine parts was 65%
(SD=16.2%). However, the last five parts were when they worked together,
and many subjects gave up monitoring the numbers on these parts. When only
the first four parts are used (these included proofreading, the feelings checklist,
reading about the partner, and writing the essay and doing the questions in the
packet), the average accuracy rate was 82% (SD=16.7). This is still outside the
acceptable accuracy range (85%) for distracted subjects, according to previous
research (Gilbert et al., 1988).
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Mental Control Deprivation. Control-deprived subjects made fewer
checkmarks in the second two minutes of the meditation task (M's: First two
mins: CD = 5.96, non-CD = 5.73; Second two mins: CD = 1.63, non-CD = 5.90;
F of interaction (1,73) = 74.10, p < .001), suggesting that they tried harder (or
censored more) after the feedback. When subjects rated their success at the
meditation task and the average UMass student's success at the task, non-
control-deprived subjects showed a positivity bias (M's: my success = 3.95,
other's success = 3.35) but control-deprived subjects reversed this bias (M's: my
success = 3.67, other's success = 3.74; F of interaction (1,73) = 3.94, p = .05).
This helps to confirm that control-deprived subjects thought they had done
slightly less well on the meditation task.
Proofreading Results
. Subjects' performance on the proofreading
activities revealed a few effects of the manipulations. Recall that subjects did
two trials of proofreading, right after the control deprivation manipulation, and
the busyness manipulation came between proofreading trials 1 and 2.
Therefore, effects of control deprivation can be seen in both trials and effects of
busyness can be seen in the difference between trials 1 and 2. Proofreading
performance was measured in rate (number of words read) and accuracy
(percentage of errors corrected).
All subjects tended to read faster in the second trial (F(l,67) = 7.26, p <
.01), but being distracted in Trial 2 interfered with this improvement, as might
be expected. (Busy x Trial interaction F(l,67) = 2.95, p = .09; M's: Busy: trial 1
= 59.2, trial 2 = 62.0; Non-busy: trial 1 = 69.1, trial 2 = 81.1). The interaction
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qualifies a main effect for busyness, where busy subjects read slower than non-
busy subjects (F(l,67) = 7.55, p < .01).
Control-deprived subjects started out at a higher proofreading rate in
Trial 1, suggesting they were more motivated initially, but did not improve
much across trials (CD x Trial interaction F(l,67) = 3.05, g < .09; M's: CD: trial
1 = 68.4, trial 2 = 70.8; non-CD: trial 1 = 60.9, trial 2 = 72.4), perhaps because
of ceiling effects on rate. Anxious subjects' rate improved from 64.0 to 73.4,
comparable to the baseline group.
Control-deprived subjects increased their accuracy between trials 1 and 2,
but only if they were not distracted. (Busy x Control-deprived x Trial
interaction F(l,67) = 4.87, g < .05); M accuracy scores from trial 1 to trial 2:
baseline = .86 to .81, only-B = .86 to .83, only-CD = .82 to .89, CD/B= .82 to
.73). The pattern showed that only-control-deprived subjects tend to increase
their accuracy between trials 1 and 2, but control-deprived/busy subjects
decrease in accuracy dramatically. This result suggests that combining busyness
and control deprivation has an effect that is not the additive effect of busyness
and control deprivation separately. Anxious subjects, like the only-CD subjects,
increased accuracy between the two trials, although not as much (M's = -84 to
.89), a result that is not consistent with the CD/B group, but may reflect the
hypothesized control deprivation component in anxiety. Anxious subjects did
not show the lower accuracy on this task that was expected.
Hardworking Versus Lazy Expectancy . As intended, subjects receiving
the hardworking expectancy rated their partners as more hardworking than did
subjects receiving the lazy expectancy (M's = 5.80 and 4.09, respectively; F(l,80)
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= 52.07, p < .001), and subjects receiving the lazy expectancy rated their
partners as more lazy than did subjects receiving the hardworking expectancy
(M's = 3.23 and 2.03, respectively; F(l,80) = 17.15, g < .001).
Impression Formation Strategies
Shjdy 2 had two general goals. One was to test again the hypotheses
from the capacity-control theory, but with what were intended as stronger
manipulations than in Study 1. Again, anxious and control-deprived/busy
subjects were expected to seek more information about their partners, use the
information less often and in less complex ways, and express a desire to control
their partners. The second goal of Study 2 was to replicate some results of the
first study, such as the significant contrast on total complexity, the effects of
busyness and control deprivation on trait ratings, and subjects' self-reports of
thought distraction and thought control.
Neither of these two goals was clearly achieved. Self-reports of
information seeking did not support the theory: Control-deprived and anxious
subjects did not want more information. Attention data did not show the
expected effect for greater attention in the CD and anxious groups, and CD
groups actually wrote less about their partners than non-CD subjects,
suggesting less effort rather than more (F(l,67) = 3.42, p = .07; M's = 57.6
words vs. 68.4 words). One predicted result was that anxious subjects did
report the most desire to control their partners (M = 4.3); however, the control-
deprived/busy group did not match them; in fact, they had the least desire to
control their partners (Busy x Control-deprived interaction: F(l,67) = 12.10. p <
.01; M's: baseline = 4.1, only-B = 3.7, only-CD = 3.7, CD/B = 2A)\ Most
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disappointing was the predicted contrast on complexity, which did not replicate
from Study 1.
The trait rating results from Study 1 did not replicate; most analyses on
traits gave null results, and one of the effects, the polarization shown by busy
subjects on ratings for "hardworking" in Study 1, was reversed (this effect is
discussed later). Anxious subjects did not show the same high verbal
productivity as in Study 1. Finally, results for the two new thought distraction
and thought control scales (alphas = .68 and .64, respectively) revealed no
significant effects.
In sum. Study 2 did not meet its desired goals. Instead, it revealed some
impression formation results that were not predicted from the capacity-control
theory or found in Study 1. One pattern of effects in Study 2 involves
expectancy, with subjects paying more attention and using more complexity in
the hardworking expectancy but mentioning lazy information more, especially
in the lazy expectancy. In addition, subjects in the busy condition, surprisingly,
evidenced more effortful processing. Here, I will present and briefly discuss
these two patterns.
Subjects May Process Positive Information On-line, And Negative
Information From Memory . The hardworking information in Study 2 seemed to
capture subjects' attention. Subjects in the hardworking expectancy spent
longer reading the partner information (M's: 87.1 vs. 79.3; F(l,62) = 4.77, p <
.05), and all subjects, regardless of expectancy, looked longer at information that
contained hardworking statements (the expectancy x consistency interaction
was significant, F(l,67) = 3.80, p = .06; M's: hardworking expectancy: consistent
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information = 9.92, inconsistent information = 9.52. Lazy expectancy:
inconsistent = 9.50, consistent = 8.62). (Anxious subjects matched this pattern.)
Subjects in the hardworking expectancy also used more compiexity-in total
complexity, differentiation, and integration-than subjects in the lazy expectancy
(Fs(l,67) = 4.14 to 10.42, p's <.05). This pattern is unusual; in most research,
people pay more attention to negative than to positive information (see Pittman
& Heller, 1987).
Although subjects in the hardworking expectancy looked longer at the
information and were more complex, those in the lazy expectancy actually
wrote more about their partners (M's = 71.65 words vs. 57.5 words; F(l,67) =
4.81, p < .05). Subjects in the lazy condition also mentioned more information
from the interview in their essays (M's = .68 vs. .36; F(l,67) = 4.81, p < .05). In
fact, all subjects mentioned the lazy information more in their essays, but this
was especially true when it was consistent (expectancy by consistency
interaction F(l,67) = 7.88, p < .01; M's: Lazy expectancy: consistent = 1.0,
inconsistent = .32. Hardworking expectancy: inconsistent = .41, consistent =
.32)*.
To summarize, subjects looked longer at hardworking information and
were more complex in that expectancy. Subjects in the lazy expectancy
mentioned the information more and write longer essays, but their essays were
less complex. One speculative description of these results is that as subjects
paid more attention to the hardworking information, they were forming
impressions on-line, so that when they were asked to write an essay, they had
ready conclusions in mind. They could therefore be concise yet complex. In
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contrast, subjects in the lazy expectancy may not have thought about the
information on-line, so they had to form their impressions from memory,
mentioning the information more and writing longer essays. This memory-
based strategy may have cost them in complexity. It is unclear, however, why
hardworking partners would have motivated the more effortful pattern,
especially in light of most other impression research.
Busy Subjects Showed More Effortful Processing
.
Surprisingly, busy
subjects used more integrative complexity in their essays than non-busy subjects
(M's = 4.79 vs. 3.36; F(l,67) = 4.14, p < .05). Further analyses revealed that this
effect was due primarily to a higher number of similarity statements. Therefore,
busy subjects may see their partners as more similar to themselves or to other
people they know. It is hard to explain why busy subjects, who presumably
had fewer cognitive resources available, showed this effortful pattern, unless it
is somehow cognitively easier to make similarity statements.
Contrary to previous research and the findings in Study 1, busy subjects
polarized less when they rated their partners on "hardworking" (F(l,67) = 4.41,
p < .05; M's: Busy subjects: hardworking expectancy: = 5.60, lazy expectancy =
4.32; Not busy subjects: hardworking = 6.04, lazy = 3.82) However, inspection
of all four cells suggested that this interaction had probably obtained not
because the busy groups polarized less, but because of non-significantly high
polarization in the only-CD group (which was included in the not-busy group;
M's (only-CD): hardworking = 6.41, lazy = 3.67). Relative to the true baseline
group (M's (baseline) hardworking = 5.70, lazy = 3.93) the busy groups
were
not less extreme.
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Busy subjects also spent longer reading the essays (F(l,62) = 28.15, p <
.001; M's = 94.4 s vs. 73.1 s). This 20 s difference probably obtained in part
because they needed to write down numbers an average of two times, and in
part because the constant monitoring caused them to read more slowly.
Other Measures
Confidence
.
Busy subjects tended to report feeling less confident than
non-busy subjects about doing well at the activities (M's = 4.87 vs. 5.41; F(l,67)
= 3.11, p = .08). Anxious subjects, who were the least confident in Study 1,
were not significantly less confident in Study 2.
Tangrams . The measures on the tangram activity were the number of
tangrams completed in the time limit (speed) and the number of tangrams
correctly identified (accuracy). Each subject had a turn describing tangrams
and a turn identifying tangrams. The analysis included only data from the
subjects' turn at identifying the tangrams. For subjects in the busy, control-
deprived, or control-deprived/busy groups, both members of the pair were
under the same manipulation, so identifications were likely based on
descriptions of equal quality. However, subjects in the baseline and the
anxious conditions sometimes had anxious partners and sometimes had baseline
partners. Therefore, I needed to test the assumption that the descriptions by
anxious subjects and baseline subjects were of equal quality. In fact, they were
not. 2 (subject: anxious or baseline) x 2 (pair type: matched or mixed) ANOVAs
indicated that people with anxious partners were less accurate (M's = anxious
partner: anxious s = 5.9, non-anxious s = 6.0; non-anxious partner: anxious s
=
7.1, non-anxious s = 7.4; F(l,31) = 5.74, p < .025) and completed fewer
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tangrams in the time limit (anxious partner: anxious s = 6.0, non-anxious s =
6.6; non-anxious partner: anxious s = 7.1, non-anxious s = 7.8; F(l,31) = 6.30 g
< .025). These results suggest that anxious subjects are not as good at
describing tangrams as non-anxious subjects. Therefore, in the analyses of the
tangram results, subjects with anxious partners were excluded. This reduced
the cell n's in the baseline and anxious groups by half.
There were two main effects for busyness such that busy subjects were
slower and less accurate at tangrams than non-busy subjects (F's (1,60) = 10.51
and 5.71, respectively, p's <.025). A busy x control-deprived interaction
(supported by a condition main effect in the 1 x 5 analysis) suggests that either
busyness, control deprivation, or anxiety decreased speed compared to the
baseline group (2 x 2: F(l,60) = 4.48, g < .05; 1 x 5: F(4,66) = 3.61, p < .025;
M's: baseline (w/baseline partners) = 7.80, only-B = 5.68, only-CD = 7.00, CD/B
= 6.56, anxious (w/anxious partners) = 6.00).
Spelling . The prediction that anxious subjects would make more errors
in spelling was not supported.
Memory
.
Recognition memory for the tangrams was correlated with the
number of tangrams completed (r = .62); therefore, the number completed was
entered as a covariate. In the analysis of memory errors (combined false alarms
and misses) a busyness main effect emerged (F(l,70) = 2.83, p < .10) but this
was qualified by a busyness x control deprivation interaction (F (1,70) = 3.48, p
=
.07). Only-busy subjects made more memory errors (adjusted M = 2.77) than
the other groups (adjusted M's: baseline = 1.61, only-CD = 1.86, CD/B = 1.84.
Anxious group adjusted M = 1-49). Interestingly, being control-deprived
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seemed to cancel out the impact of busyness on incidental memory. However,
the hypothesis that anxious subjects would have the worst memory was not
supported.
Pair Effects
.
As in Study 1, anxious and baseline pairs were tested for
effects of having an anxious partner. The feelings items and all major
dependent variables were tested; none showed the necessary interaction with
the exception of the tangram descriptions mentioned above.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 are not supportive of the capacity-control theory.
Manipulation checks suggested that the independent variables performed as
intended, yet few of the relevant dependent variables support the hypotheses,
and none replicated findings in Study 1. The only supportive result was on the
revised partner control scale, where anxious subjects scored highest, as
expected. Unfortunately, however, the control-deprived/busy group scored the
lowest. Information seeking and complexity did not show the predicted effects.
A number of factors might explain some of the failures of Study 2. First,
the busyness task was probably too difficult. Compared to the beep-counting
task of Study 1, in which beeps sounded at irregular and infrequent intervals,
monitoring the numbers was a relentiess and extremely difficult task. Busy
subjects in Study 2 made three times more errors at the busyness task than in
Study 1. They also reported feeling more anxious and energetic, perhaps
indicating extra effort on their part. They spent much longer reading their
partners' essays (and took longer to complete the experiment as a whole),
suggesting that monitoring the numbers interfered dramatically with their
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efforts. Busy subjects were less confident in the experiment than their non-
busy counterparts, suggesting that they were aware that their performance was
suffering. These confidence ratings were prophetic: Their tangram
performance and incidental memory was, in fact, worse than that of baseline
subjects. And their performance on these tasks was worse even though their
accuracy rate suggested that they had given up trying to monitor the numbers
on this tasL
A busyness manipulation that was too strong may have overpowered the
control deprivation manipulation, explaining why the control-deprived/busy
group never resembled the anxious group in this study. And to the extent that
busy subjects gave up trying to monitor the numbers, they could devote more
effort to impression tasks, accounting for why they did not differ from baseline.
Indeed, some busy subjects missed as many as 50% of the probes; perhaps they
largely ignored the numbers and chose to apply all of their attention to forming
impressions. Some busy subjects were observed to do one task or the other,
either pause to listen to the numbers or concentrate on the experiment. Such a
strategy would allow a busy subject to monitor at least some of the numbers
while performing adequately on the impression questions (but doing worse, as
was shown, on the timed tangram task).
Beyond the busyness manipulation, different situational goals may help
account for the differences in attention to hardworking and lazy information
between Studies 1 and 2. People tend to pay more attention to goal-threatening
information (Pittman & Heller, 1987), and information that threatens
interdependence goals may not threaten the goals of non-interdependent
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subjects. Specifically, interdependent situations are performance-oriented, so
subjects are especially threatened when their partners are incompetent. This
was reflected in Shidy 1 by subjects' increased use of lazy information and the
special effort control-deprived subjects used to describe their lazy partners.
In contrast, non-interdependent sihiations like Shidy 2 may be socially-
oriented by default, so subjects may be especially interested in how fun their
partners are. A social goal would account for their attention to and complexity
for the hardworking partner, whose academic single-mindedness might have
threatened a relaxed interaction. Consistent with this reasoning, subjects with
hardworking partners rated them as marginally more "boring" (F(l,67) = 3.41, g
< .07).
Alternatively, the hardworking partner may not have been threatening,
but may simply have been more surprising, thus attracting attention. Because
she studies 20 hours a week, the hardworking partner may have seemed more
extreme on the hardworking-lazy dimension than the lazy partner, who may
have been closer to subjects' conceptions of the average student (studying 3
hours a week). Extremity on this dimension, of course, may seem particularly
unexpected in a social context, and could account for subjects' complex
impressions in this expectancy (Hastie, 1984). This reasoning suggests that new
studies should equate the extremity of the two expectancies for more
experimental control.
More broadly, perhaps the differences between the two shidies occurred
because interdependence, with its accompanying outcome control deprivation,
is necessary for the hypothesized independent variables to affect impressions.
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Thus, although Study 2 was based on the assumption that interdependence
creates a ceiling effect, the results suggest instead that non-interdependence
creates a floor effect. The predicted effects of busyness, mental control
deprivation, and anxiety may obtain primarily when the outcome of the
situation matters and the partner shares control of that outcome. New
theoretical work could develop this hypothesis and its mediators.
Eysenck and Calvo's (1992) Processing Efficiency Theory complements
this reasoning with respect to anxious people. Consistent with our reasoning,
they claim that anxiety has both a distracting (worry) component and an
arousal component. Although worry interferes with performance, the arousal
component enables anxious people to make up for the deficit with greater
effort. Anxious people may then perform as well as non-anxious people, but
because it takes greater effort they are less efficient. Eysenck and Calvo predict
that motivational factors (here, interdependence), benefit non-anxious people
more than anxious people, mainly because anxious people are already
expending as much effort as they can under low motivation situations (p. 421).
This theory may explain why anxious subjects, compared to non-anxious
subjects, were low in complexity in Study 1 but higher in complexity in Study
2. Because arousal differs from control motivation, it is difficult to map this
theory onto our control deprivation hypotheses. However, it converges to some
extent with the results for the anxious subjects.
Shidy 2 did not find significantly more effortful performance by the
control-deprived groups. The control-deprived subjects in Study 1 showed
increased effort on impression variables, especially when they received negative
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information. But control-deprived subjects in Study 2, though they behaved as
expected on manipulation checks, showed no impression effects. As stated
above, it may be that mental conti-ol deprivation is not a general motivator, but
instead only spurs impression processing under the more threatening sihjation
of outcome-control deprivation. It also seems possible that the "scolding" nahire
of our failure feedback manipulated temporary self-esteem as well as control
deprivation. Thus when control-deprived subjects attended to negative
information in Study 1, they may have been favorably comparing themselves to
repair their self-images in this performance-oriented situation. However,
control-deprived subjects did not report any depressive emotions. Nevertheless,
new research could focus more on how generally motivating mental control
deprivation is, and future mental control manipulations should consider
possible self-esteem effects.
Furthermore, in neither study did mentally control-deprived subjects
show the superior cognitive performance that has been shown with outcome
control deprivation (Pittman & Pittman, 1980). Perhaps our control-deprivation
manipulation was not strong enough to affect these measures. To argue
successfully that mental control deprivation is similar to outcome control
deprivation, fuhire research should make the manipulation strong enough to
affect cognitive performance, perhaps by giving subjects more failure trials.
Across both studies. Study 2's tangram exercise was the only non-
impression performance measure on which anxious subjects showed a clear
deficit. The difference may be one of difficulty: Describing the tangrams
successfully requires abstract thought (Hupet et al., 1991), whereas spelling,
proofreading, finding words, and even thinking up alternative uses are easier
tasks to do. This pattern matches much of the test-anxiety literature, in which
anxious subjects perform worse on difficult tasks and about equally (if not
better) on simple tasks (see Eysenck, 1982, for a review).
CHAPTER 4
GENERAL DISCUSSION
These two studies offer a complex set of findings. The independent
variables often worked in predicted ways, but rarely did so in the patterns
predicted by the theory, and never worked the same way in both studies.
Anxious subjects wanted more information in Shidy 1 and wanted to control
their partners more in Study 2. They matched the control-deprived/busy group
on complexity in Study 1, where they were the least complex group. They
tended to write a lot without saying much in Study 1, and they also reported
being both distracted by their intrusive thoughts and bothered that their
thoughts were uncontrollable. Finally, anxiety did not interfere with simple
cognitive tasks in either study but did impair performance on the abstract
tangram exercise of Study 2. Thus, many effects of anxiety were as expected,
but replication of these effects was a problem.
The results for control deprivation were consistent with expectations in
Study 1 but not replicated in Study 2. Mentally control-deprived subjects
showed more effortful impressions in Study 1, where they were the most
complex (if they were not distracted), moderated their ratings of "lazy," and
rated their partners in line with the inconsistent information they had read.
Control-deprived subjects used special effort to process lazy information,
writing longer, more complex essays in this expectancy, but only in Study 1.
Cognitively busy subjects polarized on positive ratings in Study 1. They
used more similarity statements in their essays for Study 2. Busyness also
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interfered with some general cognitive tasks, such as the alternative uses
activity of Shidy 1 and the proofreading, tangram, and incidental memory tasks
of Study 2. Study 2's busyness manipulation, however, may have been too
distracting and these subjects could have adopted unintended performance
strategies on some of the measures.
When the mental control deprivation and busyness variables acted
together, they sometimes performed like two, additive distractors, sometimes
like a distractor simply added to a motivator (canceling each other out),
sometimes like one distractor acting alone, and sometimes, as hypothesized, in a
non-additive combination. Of course, the clearest support for the original
hypotheses comes when the only-busy group is lower than baseline, the only-
control-deprived group is higher than baseline, and the control-deprived/busy
group is lower than all three cells. This exact pattern happened only once, in
the total complexity result for Study 1. Therefore, specific support for the
hypotheses for this cell is scant in these two studies.
Future Directions
These were ambitious studies. As an initial test of the theory, it made
sense to cross busyness and mental control deprivation, but it was perhaps
premature to do so before the manipulations had been studied separately.
Although the effects of busyness on impressions are well-studied, specific
busyness tasks have rarely been calibrated for their distractingness or their
interaction with interdependence. Furthermore, our mental control deprivation
manipulation is the first of its kind. No standard existed to inform our choices
about manipulating this factor or adjusting it to the desired motivational
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strength. This pair of studies may have suffered because we dared to test these
two variables together before their separate effects were clearly understood.
A logical next step, therefore, would be to narrow our scope. And
because it is the least shidied of the variables in the theory, it makes sense to
focus on the development of a robust manipulation for mental control
deprivation. A contribution on this front would not only help test the capacity-
control theory, but is also interesting in its own right. Everyday life is full of
attempts to control ones' thoughts and moods, for social (Pennebaker, 1993;
Wegner & Erber, 1993), hedonic (Parrott, 1993), and coping purposes (Cioffi &
Holloway, 1993), to name a few (see Wegner & Pennebaker, 1993). The current
surge of research in this area could certainly benefit from theory connecting
mental control failure to general control motivation and its attributional
consequences. On the other side of the coin, social-cognitive work would also
benefit if mental control deprivation proved to be an impression motivator.
Finally, such work would add a new dimension to what we know about
people's need for control in general (e.g., Strickland, 1989; White, 1959).
Given the results of these two studies, a line of research on mental
control deprivation should focus on two primary goals. First, of course, a
reliable manipulation for mental control deprivation should be developed. We
still do not know how much experience with mental control failure is required
for control deprivation. It is also unclear how mental control deprivation would
affect mood or temporary self-esteem. Another difficulty is that mental control
is relatively unobservable, and the checkmark methods we used in these studies
can be censored by subjects, perhaps confusing the effects of failure feedback
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about their performance. New methods might test other ways of measuring (or
pretending to measure, for manipulation purposes) mental control.
This line of research might also consider how additional outcome control
deprivation might moderate mental control deprivation. The present shidies
suggest that interdependence may be necessary for mental control deprivation
to affect impressions. Although it would be a simple matter to cross this well-
established paradigm with mental control deprivation, so far there are no
theoretical reasons for an interaction effect. Therefore, perhaps our next efforts
should focus primarily on a reliable experimental manipulation and its effects
on attention, complexity, and final impressions. When mental control
deprivation is better understood, we can resume testing its hypothesized
interaction with busyness under the capacity-control theory.
APPENDIX A
PRIMARY EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
White Bear Exerdse (Mental Control Deprivation Manipulation;!
Please write down whatever thoughts happen to be coming into your head
right now. At the same time try NOT to think of a WHITE BEAR. If you
happen to think of one, please make a check-mark in the margin.
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Feelings Checklist
Please indicate how you feel right now by circling a level of each of the
following groups of emotions:
happy, cheerful, or joyous
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
angry, irritated, or annoyed
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
unhappy, sad, or gloomy
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
frightened, worried, or threatened
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
energetic, aroused, or keyed-up
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
tired, weary, or unreactive
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
jittered, anxious, or nervous
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
calm, relaxed, or at-ease
not at all 1 2 34 5 6 7 very much
distracted, preoccupied, or busy
not at all 1 234567 very much
enthusiastic, alive, or alert
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Impression Essay
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Impressions-Essay Paragraph
We are interested in what impressions you have of your partner right now.
Please use this page to describe what kind of person you think your partner ishow she acts, what her personality traits might be. Of course, you may not feel
that you have enough information from your partner. Please do your best
anyway, and tell us your impressions from what you know so far. You can
take up to 5 minutes to write. Your answers will never be shown to your
partner, so please try to answer honestly.
Please write your essay paragraph here:
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Trait Ratings
We'd like you to use the scales below to rate your partner on a number of
dispositions and traits. Again, do your best, using the information you have
far from your partner. Your answers will never be shown to your partner, s
please try to answer honestly.
so
My partner seems:
not at all
not at all
not at all
not at all
not at all
not at all
not at all
not at all
not at all
not at all
OUTGOING
2 3 4 5 6 7
HONEST
2 3 4 5 6 7
FRIENDLY
2 3 4 5 6 7
SMART
2 3 4 5 6 7
LAZY
2 3 4 5 6 7
LOYAL
2 3 4 5 6 7
IRRESPONSIBLE
2 3 4 5 6 7
CRABBY
2 3 4 5 6 7
NERVOUS
2 3 4 5 6 7
HARD-WORKING
2 3 4 5 6 7
extremely
extremely
extremely
extremely
extremely
extremely
extremely
extremely
extremely
extremely
not at all 1 2
LIKABLE
3 4 5 6 7 extremely
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Confidence and Partner Control Questions
Please circle the number that indicates your answers or agreement with the
following questions and statements.
I fed confident about doing weU at the activities and winning the prize.
disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 agree
I'd like to be the one to dedde how we spUt up the work on our team activities.
disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 agree
I think it will be better if my partner listens to me when we work together.
disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 agree
I think we can do better if my partner takes my advice.
disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 agree
I almost wish my partner could read my mind when we work together.
disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 agree
I hope my partner follows my suggestions.
disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 agree
I sometimes get upset because people don't anticipate my needs.
I never feel I often feel
this way 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 this way
How much control do you think each of you will have over your pair's doing
well at the activities and winning the prize?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I think she will We'll probably have I think I will have
have total control equal control total control
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How much control do you want to have over your pair's winning the prize?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I want her to I want us to have I want to have
have total control equal control total control
Thought Control Questions
In the past few moments, have you been distracted by thoughts or images
about something other than this experiment?
"l^' yes, verydistracted
^^^^
^t^l 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 distracted
In the past few moments, have you had trouble focusing your thoughts?
no, no
trouble ver^ much
at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 trouble
In the past few moments, have you been worried about anything?
no, not yes,
worried very much
at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 worried
At the moment, how much control do you feel over your thoughts and feelings-
-over whafs coming into your head?
no control at very much
all over my control over
thoughts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 my thoughts
Presentiy, are you concerned about not being able to control bothersome
thoughts or worries?
not at all very much
concerned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 concerned
Information Seeking Questions
Please help us plan future research by answering these questions:
Ideally, in this situation, I would like:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
less information the same more information
from my partner amount of from my partner
information
Ideally, I would like to have my partner's answers to:
14-16 interview questions
10-12 interview questions
7-9 interview questions
4-6 interview questions
1-3 interview questions
APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW CONTENT
Hardworking Expectancy:
Describe how you like your dasses this semester.
/ really enjoy my classes. I take 5 classes. I really like biology & anthro
& math. The/re not too hard (I guess Vm good at science-I get good
grades anyway.) Psych is fun too-the material is easy but interesting.
Describe what you do in your free time, after classes.
After class I usually study maybe 20 hours a week. I also work for a
prof and if I'm not working 1 might do some activity like frisbee or
soccer.
Lazy Expectancy:
Describe how you like your dasses this semester.
Vm not too crazy about them. I take 4 classes. I don't really like my
science classes-biology, & math (I'm not too good at science-grade-wise
anyway.) Psych is pretty fun- I don't need to study as much in there.
Describe what you do in your free time, after classes.
After class I sometimes hang out w/ friends or just watch TV and do
nothing. I study maybe 3 hours a week. Sometimes I do some activity
like frisbee or soccer.
Other answers (received by both expectancies):
Whafs the worst thing about UMass?
A lot of times when I try to study the dorm is too loud, but I usually go
somewhere else.
Whafs the best thing about UMass?
The best aspect about UMass is the big classes! Nobody ever calls on
you, and they don't care ifyou skip.
What would you like to do after you graduate?
Assuming that I do graduate. 111 probably get a job, maybe in sales.
Describe (briefly) your favorite professor.
My favorite prof taught history. He made us write two 20-page papers
and do a lot of discussion, but it was fun and really worth it!
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What was the last book you read for fun? How did you like it?
/ mainly read books for fun to blow off homework But usually Vd
rather just hang out and do nothing.
What is one of your favorite movies? Why?
/ loved "Chaplin." I thought it was great. I usually don't have time to
see movies during school because of homework.
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NOTES
'Total complexity obtained a significant interaction also between control
deprivation and expectancy (F(l,70) = 9.40, p < .01). The pattern appears to be
that control-deprived subjects used more total complexity in the lazy expectancy
(M's hardworking expectancy = 15.6, lazy expectancy = 16.9) whereas non-
control-deprived subjects used more in the hardworking expectancy (M's
hardworking expectancy = 17.1, lazy expectancy = 14.8).
^This test fails to reach .05 probably because in this study, busy subjects
tended to be anxious too (a main effect for busyness is reported later in the
text). Compared to all nonbusy subjects, anxious subjects were significantly
more anxious (M's = 3.33 vs. 2.11; f(50) = 2.74, p < .01.
^e 2x5 analysis involving the anxious group was also sigiuficant
(F(4,80) = 4.68, p < .01).
*There was also a main effect that subjects mentioned consistent
information more (F(l,67) = 4.99, p <.05); and a within-subjects main effect as
in Study 1, where subjects were more likely to mention information correctiy
than to mention only the gist of it or to mention it incorrectiy (F(2,134) = 11.48,
p < .01).
^An urunterpretable interaction with busyness also obtained on the self-
report measure for information seeking; busy subjects wanted more information
in the lazy expectancy (M's = 9.44 vs. 8.24), whereas non-busy subjects (and
anxious subjects) wanted more information in the hardworking expectancy (M's
= 9.70 vs. 7.85; F(l,65) = 9.84, p < .01).
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